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Abstract 
The paper-bill spread was extremely volatile during the 2007-2009 crisis, jumping 
anywhere from 8 to 119 basis points. Since the spread is a proxy for credit market frictions, 
recent events have brought renewed interest in the relationship between monetary policy and the 
credit market. Empirical work on this literature has focused on one sample period. Boivin and 
Giovanni (2003), find that changes in monetary policy conduct reduce the effectiveness of a 
monetary shock after 1980. Using 1980 as my breakpoint, I seek to answer the following 
question: how does the paper-bill spread respond to a monetary shock? My VAR impulse 
responses and variance decompositions indicate that the spread reacts less to a monetary shock 
after 1980 but remains more persistent. These results suggest that structural changes in the credit 
market have fundamentally delayed monetary transmission.  
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I. Introduction 
During the 2007-2009 financial crisis, the paper-bill spread jumped anywhere from 8 to 
119 basis points. Following this highly volatile period, the US economy nearly slipped into 
another depression. The spread, the difference between the commercial paper (CP) and Treasury 
bill rate, measures credit market frictions that may amplify monetary transmission. The crisis has 
brought renewed attention to the relationship between credit frictions and monetary policy. In 
order to investigate this relationship, I answer the following question: how does the paper-bill 
spread respond to a monetary shock? 
Empirical work on this topic focuses on one sample period. This work does not consider 
structural changes in the US economy that may have affected the credit market. Boivin and 
Giovanni (2003) discover that monetary shocks on output and inflation are less effective after 
1980 because monetary policy responds better to inflation expectations and demand shocks. My 
contribution is to divide my sample period and determine whether the paper-bill spread reacts 
differently before and after 1980. 
Vector Autoregression (VAR) is the most common empirical method to examine 
monetary policy. Using the federal funds rate as a measure of monetary policy, my VAR 
determines a monetary shock by accounting for output, consumption, inflation, and commodity 
inflation as endogenous factors. Impulse response functions and variance decompositions reveal 
that the reaction of the spread to a monetary shock is lesser in magnitude but remains more 
persistent after 1980.  
Boivin and Giovanni’s model assumes complete financial markets. If this is true, the 
spread would have remained stable during the financial crisis. Credit frictions are an important 
reality that they neglect. For example, lenders charge a markup to borrowers to compensate for 
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agency costs (Bernanke and Gertler 1995). The spread increases when lenders must obtain and 
monitor information about the borrower, who knows more about his credit risks and may accept 
underpriced loans that do not correctly account for these risks. 
 I interpret Boivin and Giovanni’s result from the standpoint of credit frictions. My 
impulses responses and variance decompositions suggest that credit frictions react differently to 
a monetary shock after 1980 and delay its effectiveness. Therefore, changes in the conduct of 
monetary policy may not be the only reason why monetary transmission changed after 1980. 
Also, I investigate reasons why this may be true, including growth in the derivatives market. 
Companies have improved risk management practices that may boost lender confidence and 
stabilize the credit market. 
 The rest of my paper is as follows. The literature review summarizes previous works that 
examine a monetary shock on financial spreads. The methodology section explains the basic 
assumptions in my VAR and how my work differs from Boivin and Giovanni. The data section 
looks over trends that suggest credit market frictions have decreased over time. The results 
section provides a storyline interpretation of my work. In my conclusion, I note that a more 
specified model is needed to determine how monetary transmission has changed. 
II. Literature Review  
 A few studies analyze monetary shocks on financial spreads. Wingender runs a time 
series regression on the LIBOR-bill spread. Rather than using interest rate innovations through a 
VAR, Wingender identifies monetary shocks by using data on Fed futures on dates where an 
FOMC meeting takes place. He then excludes dates where he believes a monetary shock is 
endogenously affected by other macroeconomic factors. Wingender finds that a positive shock 
increases interbank risk premia. One shortcoming is that the he subjectively assumes these 
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shocks are exogenous, when in fact they may be responding endogenously to other economic 
factors. 
 Ewing analyzes how a monetary shock affects the default risk premium, defined to be the 
spread between low grade corporate bonds rated Baa and 10 year Treasury bond rates, spanning 
over the period January 1981 to September 2000. His VAR uses generalized response functions, 
which are not sensitive to the ordering of variables. Unlike the popular Cholesky ordering, 
generalized response functions account for all the contemporaneous effects of variables without 
any lag. His impulse response reveals that a positive monetary shock actually decreases the 
premium. However, a generalized response of interest rates treats the interest rate as the first in 
the Cholesky ordering of a regular VAR and, therefore, may be very unreliable (Kim 2009).  
Bernanke et al. (1999) look at the six month paper-bill spread in the empirical part of 
their paper. Using a standard Cholesky decomposition, they identify a monetary shock by 
placing the funds rate variable next to last in the Cholesky ordering and assume that the spread 
does not have any useful information for setting contemporaneous monetary policy. Consistent 
with their DSGE model, their impulse responses reveal that an expansionary monetary shock 
decreases the spread. The spread immediately decreases less than 20 basis points and returns to 
normal levels after four quarters. One drawback is that, since their paper is primarily focused on 
the theoretical model, they do not mention the number of lags or confidence intervals. 
Boivin and Giovanni analyze monetary policy before and after 1980. Their impulse 
responses reveal that the effectiveness of monetary policy has diminished in the latter period. 
Using a fully specified model, they argue that the Fed’s increased responsiveness to inflation 
expectations explains almost all of the reduced effect of monetary shocks since 1980. They also 
run a VAR with output, inflation, commodity inflation, and the federal funds rate in two 
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quarterly data sets. The first set runs from 1959 Q1-1979 Q3. The second set runs from 1979 Q4-
2002 Q2.  
One key assumption behind their model is that financial markets are complete. They treat 
all investment expenditures as if it were non-durable consumption. Since markets are complete, 
risks are efficiently shared such that each household faces the same intertemporal budget 
constraint and choose to consume the same amount at each date. The counterfactuals from their 
estimated model parameters match their actual impulse responses closely. 
According to Fender, markets may run efficiently if firms optimize their hedging 
strategies. Derivatives enable users to transfer risks. Fender’s model incorporates the use of 
interest rate derivatives to protect firms from informational asymmetries. The model assumes 
firm investment behavior for two periods and generates a financial accelerator. The underlying 
agency problem creates incentives for firms to hedge. If firms use the optimal hedging strategy, 
all interest rate effects are reduced to pure cost-of-capital effects, eliminating financial frictions 
altogether. 
My contribution is to run two VARs with 1980 as the breakpoint. My VAR accounts for 
the endogeneity of monetary policy and is an improvement over Wingender’s subjective 
approach. My impulse responses rely on less critical assumptions than those of Ewing. Similar to 
Bernanke et al. (1999), I place the spread last in the Cholesky ordering. In addition to Boivin and 
Giovanni’s variables, I include consumption because it plays an important part in their model 
and monetary policy. Finally, by determining whether the spread has responded differently to a 
monetary shock, I interpret their results from the standpoint of financial frictions.  
 
 
7 
 
III. Methodology 
 Some researchers, such as Wingender, attempt to identify a monetary shock by looking 
for dates in which they believe an exogenous shock took place. However, monetary policy reacts 
endogenously to economic activity, and variables such as output and inflation may respond to 
each other. Therefore, VAR is the appropriate tool to analyze monetary policy because it treats 
every variable endogenously.  
 Monetary policy encompasses a broad range of actions. According to Wingender, the Fed 
may exploit the rhetoric of FOMC statements to influence expected future rates and influence 
risk premiums. The Fed may extend lending facilities and expand on its definition of collateral, 
as in the case of Bear Stearns and AIG during the 2008 crises. Defining monetary policy this way 
is not useful for a VAR because these kinds of actions can hardly be quantified.    
 Researchers use several measures of monetary policy for a VAR. One example is 
innovations in broad money aggregates. Christiano et al. (1996) argue that shocks to broad 
money aggregates primarily reflect shocks to money demand while innovations in non-borrowed 
reserves, a subcategory of money aggregates, involve exogenous shocks in monetary policy. 
 However, the most persuasive argument I find is by Bernanke and Blinder (1992). They 
argue that the federal funds rate is the best measure of monetary policy for three reasons. First, 
out of all the measures, it is the best at forecasting the economy. Second, their estimates of the 
monetary policy reaction functions suggest that the Fed purposefully manipulates this rate. Third, 
the funds rate reflects genuine policy changes, not only endogenous responses to the economy. 
For these reasons, I use the funds rate as my measure of monetary policy.  
 I define vector                                        
  where       is 
real GDP in United States,       is real personal consumption,      and       stand for 
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consumer price index and commodity producer price index, respectively, and         is the 
three month nonfinancial AA commercial paper rate subtracted by the three month Treasury 
secondary market rate. Impulse response functions display the effects of shocks on an adjustment 
path over time. Variance decompositions measure the contribution of one variable to the forecast 
error variance in other variables.  
 Mathematically, the structural form of VAR is the following:  
                             
where    is the k x k matrix for i = 1, ... ,p and    is a k x 1 vector of constants.    is a k x 1 
vector of normally distributed error terms called structural shocks and satisfies the following 
properties: 
 1.         
 2.              where I is the identity matrix 
 3.               where h is nonzero integer 
The reduced form VAR is  
      
       
              
           
     
                             
where      
     ,      
     for i= 1, … , p , and       
          is the reduced form 
error term that satisfies the same properties as    except the second property, in which case 
             where   is a contemporaneous covariance matrix, and the non- 
    diagonal elements can be nonzero 
 With higher p, the model may over fit the data. The Schwarz criterion selects the 
appropriate number of lags by introducing a penalty term for the number of parameters in the 
model. Searching up to three lags, the Schwarz criterion justifies p=1 both before and after 1980.  
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 The moving average (MA) representation of VAR is useful for understanding impulse 
response analysis. Now that p=1, I can rewrite the reduced form as 
                 
I define lag operator L such that           so that   
                
If         is invertible, then we can rewrite it as an infinite sum. 
                  
        
  
           
The following equation traces out the paths of impulse responses: 
                       
       
However,       
     , and    is unknown. I make use of the fact that 
                  
            
         
     
      
  is known, but there are infinitely many ways to decompose   into two matrices. The most 
popular method is to use Cholesky decomposition, whereby   
   
 is assumed to be lower 
triangular. This method implies my results are very sensitive to the ordering of variables due to 
different timing assumptions. My ordering is in line with most economists, including Boivin and 
Giovanni, who place the output variables first, followed by inflation, then the funds rate. 
 The following is a lower triangular matrix that illustrates Cholesky Decomposition. 
[c1 0 0 0 0 0 
c2 c3 0 0 0 0 
c4 c5 c6 0 0 0 
c7 c8 c9 c10 0 0 
c11 c12 c13 c14 c15 0 
c16 c17 c18 c19 c20 c21] 
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 Since the funds rate is ordered second to last, monetary policy affects output and inflation 
variables with a one period lag. Since spread is last in my ordering, it can respond 
contemporaneously to a monetary shock due to the coefficient c21. Impulse response analysis 
consists of a one standard deviation structural shock in    and plotting   
 
   over, in my case, 16 
quarters after the shock.   
 The residual of my VAR regression on funds rate is the exogenous component of 
monetary policy that cannot be predicted by levels of output and inflation. Because others have 
identified a monetary policy shock in a similar way, I am confident that my residual is mostly 
unbiased. The problem with putting more variables in the regression is that they lose degrees of 
freedom, so it is hard to make any meaningful conclusions this way. Most VARs have no more 
than six. 
 I imitate Bernanke et al. (1999) by placing the spread as the very last variable in my 
Cholesky ordering. The implication is that spread has no marginal contemporaneous effect on 
monetary policy. One problem with this assumption is that the spread can forecast output by 
signaling changing default probabilities or corporate cash flows (Friedman and Kuttner 1993). 
The Fed may consider the spread in setting current policy. However, I believe my identification 
of monetary policy is valid because economists debate the forecasting property of the spread, 
which means it probably is not a significant factor in setting current policy. Also, my model does 
not leave out the impact that the spread may have on monetary policy in subsequent periods.  
 Runkle criticizes how confidence intervals from normal approximations are too wide so 
that meaningful conclusions cannot be drawn from them. To calculate confidence intervals, I use 
Efron’s bootstrap technique. Since residuals represent true disturbances, it should not matter in 
what order the disturbances occur. Bootstrapping reorders the sequencing of estimated residuals 
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and calculates a separate impulse response for them, holding the original coefficients constant. I 
use the JMulTi program to repeat this procedure exactly 1000 times. Out of these projected 
impulse responses, the 95th percentiles are plotted along with the original response.   
 One drawback with impulse response analysis is that plotted graphs require subjective 
judgment in comparing the response of variables before and after 1980. Variance decompositions 
reveal in percentage terms how much variation in each variable’s forecast error is due to a 
monetary shock.  
IV. Data Description 
 My two sample periods are 1971Q2-1979Q4 and 1980Q1-2011Q4 from the United States. 
All my data are from the Federal Reserve Economic Database (FRED), except the 3 month CP 
rate from the IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS). Since the IFS only goes back to 1971, 
my time series begins there. CPI is seasonally adjusted. Overall, there are 35 observations in the 
first period and 128 for the second. The FRED only has RGDP on a quarterly frequency, so I 
convert other data to be quarterly as well by averaging them.  
 The nonfinancial rather than the financial spread is more relevant for dealing with 
informational frictions that affect the entire economy. While mostly banks issue financial paper, 
various industries, from manufacturing to energy, comprise nonfinancial paper. Only large 
corporations with stable balance sheets issue CP for short-term financing needs, such as paying 
for inventories. The risk of default on CP is very low compared to other securities. The primary 
holders of CP are large institutions such as money market mutual funds, funding corporations, 
and nonprofit organizations (Anderson). Therefore, the spread deals with informational frictions 
on a large institutional level rather than individuals or small businesses. 
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 I take the logs and de-trend real gross domestic product, real personal consumption 
expenditures, consumer price index for all urban consumers, and producer price index for all 
commodities to obtain      ,      ,     , and      , respectively. My method is the 
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter technique, which finds the deviations from a trend in time series. 
Rather than filter each sample period, I filter the entire 1971-2011 period because there is no 
reason to believe that the trends have fundamentally changed after an arbitrary cutoff date. Also, 
my penalty parameter is 1600, which is the amount recommended by Hodrick and Prescott for 
quarterly data. My filtering technique contrasts that of Boivin and Giovanni, who find deviations 
of the natural logarithm of quarterly RGDP from a linear trend.     
 Below is a table of sample means. Because HP filtered data have zero average, I only 
concern with     and        .  
Period             
1971Q2-1979Q4 7.19 0.82 
1980Q1-2011Q4 5.65 0.51 
 
 Below is a table of standard deviations. 
Period             
1971Q2-1979Q4 2.63 0.71 
1980Q1-2011Q4 3.91 0.39 
 
 The spread has a lower mean after 1980 and is less volatile, suggesting that informational 
frictions have decreased over time. The history of the CP market shows that the spread does not 
respond as sensitively to economic downturns as before. According to the following graph, the 
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peak of the spread occurred during the 1973-1974 stock market crash in which the economy was 
hit by a series of oil price shocks and the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. In 1989 the 
market oversaw three defaults, with four more followed in 1990 (Anderson). The spread during 
this time period was nowhere near the level of 1973-1974. During the financial crisis, the spread 
increased relatively modestly to levels no more than that of 1989-1990. These patterns imply that 
informational frictions have decreased so that the spread should not be as responsive to monetary 
shocks as time progresses. 
 
 Alternatively, the historic decrease in spread may be due to supply and demand factors. 
MMMFs may have changed the dynamics of supply and demand factors to lower the long-term 
equilibrium interest rates of CP. Money Market Mutual Funds (MMMFs) began in 1971 and 
fundamentally spurred growth in the CP market throughout the 70s and 80s (Anderson). 
Although CP had existed long before, MMMF shares provided more accessibility to the CP 
market. Investors and savers found MMMF shares to be a diversified, low risk alternative to 
bank deposits. The supply of funds increased and lowered the equilibrium interest rate. Also, in 
the past decade, companies have taken advantage of low rates to issue longer-term securities so 
the demand for CP has decreased, lowering the spread.  
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V. Results  
My impulse responses confirm Giovanni and Boivin’s finding that monetary shocks are less 
effective after 1980: 
1971Q2-1979Q4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 
 
 
 
1980Q1-2011Q4 
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 Before 1980, RGDP and consumption are more sensitive to a monetary shock. RGDP 
responds immediately and is statistically significant by the third period. Boivin and Giovanni’s 
RGDP response shows the nadir around four quarters, and so does mine. Consumption responds 
slightly faster but mirrors RGDP in the timing of its response. The fund rate’s response is similar 
to Boivin and Giovanni’s. The spread immediately increases close to 30 basis points but is only 
significant for about a quarter. Similar to Bernanke et al. (1999), the response crosses zero 
around the fourth quarter.  
 While Boivin and Giovanni’s inflation response increases for a period and declines, mine 
has the price puzzle. The price puzzle is a common occurrence in VAR literature and will require 
more theoretical work to be resolved. The commodity index also shows a price puzzle that is 
significant for a couple periods.  
 After 1980, RGDP does not respond for four quarters. It decreases thereafter and 
eventually becomes significant. This response contrasts sharply with the previous period. Boivin 
and Giovanni show a faster decline in output, but it is not significant at all. Consumption 
decreases faster but is still statistically insignificant until a couple years have passed. The funds 
rate responds by remaining positive for all sixteen periods. Boivin and Giovanni’s response has 
the funds rate starting positive but returning to normal levels after two quarters. The spread 
immediately increases by eight basis points and is insignificant at first. However, the spread 
declines very slowly, remaining significantly positive for a couple years.   
 The following tables list variance decompositions of a monetary shock on another 
variable. For example, 29.94% of the spread forecast variance is attributed to a monetary shock 
in the first period for 1971-1979.  
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1971Q2-1979Q4 
Period RGDP CONS CPI COMM FF SPREAD 
1 0 0 0 0 67.5535 29.94196 
2 0.210878 2.329464 3.345279 5.977982 52.43388 27.68603 
3 1.845129 6.449748 7.578958 10.56956 40.67949 26.07244 
4 4.908642 10.14039 10.76836 13.21497 31.62479 25.02947 
5 8.177875 12.87449 12.58208 14.29008 24.5284 23.92972 
6 10.88028 14.53923 13.10255 14.10514 19.54824 22.60769 
7 12.69742 15.09868 12.56321 13.00658 16.58932 21.27271 
8 13.50991 14.63983 11.30856 11.44111 15.20475 20.19201 
9 13.35695 13.44015 9.742559 9.859989 14.86058 19.50552 
10 12.46441 11.91912 8.23645 8.592115 15.08362 19.20029 
11 11.20324 10.49003 7.048103 7.790819 15.49293 19.16138 
12 9.960916 9.428199 6.295272 7.460089 15.79885 19.23181 
13 9.013978 8.83407 5.978413 7.512099 15.81277 19.26009 
14 8.479844 8.672796 6.023117 7.817563 15.4677 19.13621 
15 8.34339 8.834075 6.318156 8.238313 14.82392 18.81635 
16 8.510301 9.178953 6.741512 8.647658 14.03487 18.32925 
 
 
1980Q1-2011Q4 
 
Period RGDP CONS CPI COMM FF SPREAD 
1 0 0 0 0 87.10322 8.799302 
2 0.004189 0.007218 0.18602 0.083897 84.90091 12.69249 
3 0.008165 0.037579 0.660586 0.28152 82.66407 16.20378 
4 0.007019 0.117122 1.433241 0.575217 80.93437 19.08743 
5 0.012116 0.27883 2.469777 0.929174 79.63166 21.4256 
6 0.049777 0.555288 3.701022 1.301354 78.63704 23.33826 
7 0.152271 0.971393 5.039052 1.654557 77.87271 24.91218 
8 0.348452 1.539049 6.396097 1.963073 77.29199 26.21055 
9 0.657181 2.254746 7.699808 2.214237 76.8639 27.28517 
10 1.084149 3.100176 8.900982 2.406349 76.56423 28.18065 
11 1.621735 4.045482 9.973821 2.545044 76.37166 28.93468 
12 2.251265 5.054218 10.91143 2.639697 76.2665 29.57795 
13 2.94685 6.088754 11.71964 2.700666 76.23067 30.13447 
14 3.679766 7.114906 12.41134 2.737544 76.24791 30.62245 
15 4.422444 8.105004 13.00224 2.758273 76.30409 31.05548 
16 5.151345 9.039215 13.50816 2.768891 76.38727 31.4436 
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 Due to my Cholesky ordering, a monetary shock only affects spread in the first period. 
For all other variables, the percentages in the first period are zero due to my one period lag 
assumption.  
 The numbers reveal that monetary shocks are less effective in the latter period. However, 
the fact that a monetary shock accounts for less than one percent of the forecast variance of 
RGDP and consumption for at least seven quarters is somewhat troubling. These numbers seem 
quite low. On a positive note, monetary policy does have a stronger effect on these variables 
after two years. 
 Taken together, my impulse responses and variance decompositions reveal a fascinating 
story. Before 1980, a monetary shock accounts for a greater proportion in the forecast variances 
of RGDP, consumption, inflation, commodity inflation, and spread for the first year. The impulse 
responses show that credit frictions flow into the economy and put an immediate halt on growth 
in output and consumption. With the spread, the percentage of its forecast variance due to a 
monetary shock decreases steadily before 1980. The impulse response of the spread shows that 
frictions have died out by the time the economy is in recession. The effectiveness of monetary 
policy is short-term. 
  After 1980, financial frictions behave much differently. At first, monetary tightening has 
no effect on economic output and the credit market. However, credit conditions remain adverse 
and discourage consumer spending for long periods of time. The percentage of spread’s forecast 
variance due to interest rates increases steadily, and the impulse response remains significantly 
positive. After a couple of years, businesses cut output as demand falls. The effectiveness of 
monetary policy is long-term. 
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 Overall, my impulse responses and forecast variances confirm Boivin and Giovanni’s 
result that monetary shocks are less effective post-1980. But the story is more complex. 
Structural changes in the credit market may have delayed the effectiveness of monetary policy. 
Why have frictions responded so differently? 
 One explanation is the growth in derivative markets over the past few decades.  
Derivatives allow companies to manage cash flows by hedging against economic downturns and 
interest rate fluctuations. 1973 marked the beginning of the Chicago Board Options Exchange 
and the Black-Scholes option pricing model. Swaps and other OTC derivatives began to arise in 
the 1980s (Greenberger). Below is a graph of notional amount outstanding for total interest rate 
swaps, interest rate options, and cross-currency swaps from the International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association market survey. 
 
The derivatives market for interest rates has grown rapidly and is now a fundamental part 
of our economy. Fender’s model helps explain why the spread has not responded as significantly 
in the latter period. Because firms are well hedged, their future cash flows are more certain, and 
investors are willing to lend more. The costs of monitoring the firm’s cash flows have decreased. 
The steadily declining response of the spread in post-1980 comes from improved risk 
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management practices in which derivatives cushion the impact of adverse conditions. Without 
derivatives, firms bear the full brunt of the magnitude of informational frictions in the first few 
quarters.  
From this standpoint, output and inflation respond less to a monetary shock because there 
are not enough frictions in the economy to propagate interest rate effects. Lack of hedging and 
undeveloped risk management practices make economic activity more susceptible to monetary 
shocks before 1980. Derivatives help companies disperse losses from interest rate fluctuations 
across several periods. This may be why the response is small but positively significant for many 
periods in the second sample. 
 Conceivably, improved monetary policy conduct may also reduce frictions and sensitivity 
of the spread. Stabilization of output promotes certainty of future cash flows and encourages 
lenders not to waste resources to acquire more information on borrowers. This would explain 
how a monetary shock affects the spread less after 1980. But I find no obvious reason why 
monetary policy causes the spread to remain positive for so long in the second sample and die off 
quickly in the first sample. Monetary policy may explain the magnitude of the responses, but it 
does not intuitively explain the different path of impulse responses. For this, a more fully 
specified model is needed. 
VI. Conclusion  
I answer the question, “How does the paper-bill spread respond to a monetary shock?” 
Before 1980, the spread responds very strongly but returns to normal levels after a few quarters. 
After 1980, the spread increases by a much smaller magnitude but does not return back to normal 
levels for a few years. 
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Some problems question the validity of my findings. For example, my first sample period 
is one decade, and my second period spans three decades. My conclusions on the first period are, 
therefore, not as strong. Also, the price puzzle appears in both sets of impulse responses. 
Although this is a common occurrence in VAR literature, increasing inflation after a monetary 
contraction may be hard to reconcile with theory. Third, forecast variances for output and 
consumption seem too low for several quarters after a monetary shock in the post-1980 era.  
However, Boivin and Giovanni’s work confirm my results that monetary policy has 
become less effective in recent decades. Despite a few minor differences, my impulse responses 
mimic theirs. Since monetary shocks affect other variables the way it should, I am confident in 
my conclusions on the spread. 
The growth in derivative markets may change the behavior of the credit market. 
According to Fender’s model, optimal hedging strategies reduce monetary shocks to pure cost-
of-capital effects. The one shortcoming is that this model does not explain why frictions delay 
monetary transmission. The policy implication is that the Fed must time their decisions earlier to 
stabilize output. 
Another reason may be that improved monetary policy decreases frictions by stabilizing 
output and inflation. If this is the case, the Fed should not waver from its policies to continue 
promoting market efficiency. If the Fed changes rates drastically, it can amplify these frictions 
and exacerbate economic swings.  
The policy that the Fed should take depends a great deal on the exact relationship 
between credit frictions and monetary transmission. Unfortunately, because VAR is largely an 
atheoretical model, it cannot formally extract this relationship. The next step is to incorporate 
market frictions in a more specified theoretical model and perform counterfactual experiments on 
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these impulse responses. For future empirical work, other proxies for market frictions, such as 
the prime-bill spread, may be useful to confirm my results. The financial paper-bill spread may 
draw new insight into how frictions uniquely affect the banking system. Other measures of 
inflation, such as GDP deflator, may overcome the price puzzle. Despite my progress, what 
exactly caused the spread to be so volatile during the 2007-2009 crisis remains a mystery. 
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